To Lincoln, the federal government retained authority over all thirty-plus states were under his jurisdiction. By holding to the belief of a rightful Union, he continued to exercise some level of authority over all them, even if it was only blockade south of the Mason-Dixon line.
More than once he corrected General Henry Halleck for using phraseology that did not conform to a usage of a United States: "You know I did not like the phrase, in Orders, No. 68 I believe, "Drive the invaders from our soil." (Letter, July 6, 1863). They were not invaders--they were fellow citizens of the U.S.
The suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in Maryland, April 1861 to 1862, is an early exercise in Lincoln's assumption of that authority, backed up by force. But Lincoln also had to practice diplomacy within his community of individual states: they were turning on each other. And governors frequently wrote Lincoln, telling him exactly how little support they would give for [x] or how much support they needed for [y].
Even More Complicated
In most formulations of Civil War America, the U.S. map is divided into three useful categories: North, South, and border states. The border states were mostly slave-holding states that held with the Union.The question of slavery was united with many other issues, red herrings or not. Popular sovereignty and states' rights was a rallying cry in pockets of nearly every state of the Union. The Democratic party was a major party in every state, not just Southern ones; they might decry any Republican measure. Some were anti-war, or at least, anti-Civil War: the Peace Democrats, and more flagrantly in opposition, the "Copperheads". The famous habeas corpus Valladigham Case was in Ohio, a Union state with Clement Valladigham potentially a Copperhead governor. Ultimately, Lincoln declined to hold Mr. Valladigham. Instead, he was allowed to go South, into sympathetic territory.
Local Terrain and Cooperation
With the blue states and the light blue ones above, Lincoln had to work with the Governors and officials that would let him, and make war on those who would not. He needed political and military forecasts, a way to bolster pro-Union officials and to cajole or contain those who would let Union break to pieces. For every suspension of habeas corpus, there were hundreds, even thousands of efforts to hold Union together without playing hardball--or, by granting exceptions to hard rules in the name of decency, mercy, or even expediency.
With the blue states and the light blue ones above, Lincoln had to work with the Governors and officials that would let him, and make war on those who would not. He needed political and military forecasts, a way to bolster pro-Union officials and to cajole or contain those who would let Union break to pieces. For every suspension of habeas corpus, there were hundreds, even thousands of efforts to hold Union together without playing hardball--or, by granting exceptions to hard rules in the name of decency, mercy, or even expediency.
An Early Diplomacy: Stay on Point. Do Not Speculate.
During the 1859 presidential election, Lincoln wrote constantly to delegates and campaigners about staying 'on message'. The message without variation was contentious enough. He also stayed aloof from personal attacks, devising tactics for countering smear campaigns that left him carefully above. Post-election, the calls for further explanation of his policies continued. Lincoln stayed low-key in Illinois, generally providing only references to his previous record. Along with this demand for explanations, he had to field the calls of patronage. On December 15, 1860, he partly broke his silence to answer a letter containing rumors about "stacking the deck" using patronage:
"As to the use of patronage in the slave states, where there are few or no Republicans, I do not expect to inquire for the politics of the appointee, or whether he does or not own slaves. I intend in that matter to accommodate the people in the several localities, if they themselves will allow me to accommodate them."This letter came before the second wave of secession or even before Lincoln's inauguration ceremony. He was already attempting to hold onto everyone who would stay. As reported in a previous post, the attack on Fort Sumter caused Lincoln to break his silence. By calling for militia to defend the Union, he may have precipitated the second wave of secession. Such perilous outcomes only made Lincoln more determined to hang on to what he could. Another look at the map's light-blue states shows you how much strategic territory he was trying to hold.
Under Suspension of Habeas Corpus: Limiting Military Rule
This letter to General John M. Schofield, local commander of Union forces in St. Louis, Missouri
July 13, 1863
I regret to learn of the arrest of the Democrat editor. I fear this loses you the middle position I desired you to occupy. . . . Please spare me the trouble this is likely to bring [.]A translation: you stupid jerk. Let him go. Another one, a few months later, to the same man:
October 1, 1863
"Your immediate duty, in regard to Missouri, now is to advance the efficiency of that establishment, and to so use it, as far as practicable, to compel the excited people there to leave one another alone."In other words, Schofield was to let the state take the lead whenever possible in local police matters. Not that there was a police. There was only military and home guard. Lincoln's instructions are explicitly to keep the peace:
". . . you will only arrest individuals, and suppress assemblies, or newspapers, when they may be working palpable injury to the Military in your charge; and in no other case will you interfere with the expression of opinion in any form, or allow it to be interfered with violently by others."This instruction shows that Lincoln did not want to deny Missourians their civil rights, even under the suspension of the writ. Also important to Lincoln's concerns, however, is a strong with not to alienate state voters used to considering liberty their birthright. Lincoln was constantly on watch to make sure that his local militaries were secure. The civil rights were to be left alone--unless necessary for military security. It also shows that his military, then as ever, were expected to be, partly, diplomats.
There are hundreds of letter where Lincoln listens to personal appeals from the parents of deserters, the wives of fallen Confederate heroes, mothers in poverty whose sons are in stockade for some infraction were not paid, former Senator's sons in Federal prison, et cetera. Each one of these letters, whether giving way or not, is calculated to offer a mercy when it did not interfere with a rational military principle.
These are efforts at diplomacy, to right wrongs and keep state officials happy, newspapers a little more quiet, and citizens calm. But the best example of Lincoln's domestic diplomacy especially concerning the Border States brings us where we started.
The Emancipation Proclamation
My first post on Lincoln was about this important document. There, above, and elsewhere, I said Lincoln did insist he had jurisdiction over all states. With the Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln paid the secessionist states an economic ultimatum for a political one. For the border states, it is different. It required diplomacy, or, not giving the first ultimatum that would get him an answering one back. Insisting on emancipation there would lose him whatever shred of political or military support he had.
Though Lincoln wrote some adamant letters to Tennessee's governor, and allowed some punitive regimes in Kentucky, et cetera, he was nevertheless at least partly sympathetic to their plight. Missouri's, Tennessee's and Kentucky 's economies were closely tied to other slave states, particularly in regard to shipping their cash crops downriver via the Mississippi. Their existing commerce was essentially ruined by staying in the Union. To take away the last prop of their economy, however heinous that prop might be, would be to lose them forever--and maybe the war.
All states paid heavily in the Civil War. Lincoln's soft-pedal on slavery in the border States via the Emancipation Proclamation acknowledges their particular economic hardship, their uneasy (and sometimes enforced) yet ultimate loyalty. These border states took the brunt in most of the battles of the Civil War: militarily, politically, and economically.
Today, Lincoln's detractors have revived old tired arguments against this great, beleaguered, and frequently unpopular leader. They have counted on our failure to examine Lincoln's historical context in full. But Lincoln's words reveal the great care he took in his leadership, in both big and small matters. His milieu was one of cantankerous states used to deciding for themselves. The Union was ripping at every seam. Lincoln had a stiff spine but also a compassionate view. His letters and speeches reveal his profound understanding of lasting and humane principles, military leadership, economic necessity, diplomacy, and the context of his age.
---
I hope you have enjoyed this (12 part) series, which was originally intended to be three posts. :-)
Thanks to Slamdunk for suggesting it! What an adventure! And especially thank you to all who commented along the way. You kept me going, through many lamps of midnight oil.
References:
Abraham Lincoln, Speeches and Writings, 1859-1865. The Library of America. Available.
The American Civil War: Habeas Corpus, at etym online, especially useful and linked above, here
Shelby Foote, The Civil War, Volume I. Random House. Available.
A fine paper written by C.R. Smith, posted here.
US Government Info at About.com, with Lincoln's 1862 Proclamation suspending the writ of habeus corpus, here. This is short.
Wikipedia, Border States. From that Wikipedia page you can access pages such as "Kentucky in the Civil War" that give more details to what I have quickly glossed. Kentucky is particularly interesting in that it was under a very tough general and under conditions of guerilla war.
No comments:
Post a Comment